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Recently, Switzerland’s system of justice has made plenty of negative headlines
owing to its Federal Attorney’s failures and misconducts, its Federal Criminal Court’s
internal grievances, the Federal Supreme Court’s deficient work as supervisory
authority of the former, and the Federal Supreme Court’s president’s sexist
verbal abuse made in the same context. These days, reports spread about yet
another dubious story: about the election of judges to the Federal Supreme Court,
Switzerland’s apex court.
Criticism against the procedure through which Switzerland elects its judges to its
(highest) courts is nothing new, but recent events brought this issue once again
to the forefront. The main point of concern is that any hopeful candidate must be
a member of a political party represented in parliament: party membership is a
de facto requirement to be elected even to the Federal Supreme Court. Federal
Supreme Court judgeships – until retirement age unlimitedly renewable six-year
terms (Art. 145 FC; Art. 9 FSCA) – are “distributed” among the parliamentary groups
according to their proportional representation in the Federal Parliament (so-called
Fraktionenproporz). These days, a civil society organisation spread reports about an
unforeseen attempt to politicise the upcoming elections. According to these reports,
the Swiss People’s Party – which is by far Switzerland’s strongest party, but does not
nearly control a parliamentary majority – endeavours to prevent one of “its” judges’
re-election because of his support of judgments contrary to the party programme.
Elections to the Federal Supreme Court of
Switzerland
38 judges (plus 19 supplementary, part-time judges) divided in seven divisions
constitute the Federal Supreme Court of Switzerland seated in Lausanne. The
judges are elected by the United Chambers of the Federal Assembly (i.e. the joint
meeting of the two parliamentary chambers; Art. 168 FC) by absolute majority (Arts.
136-137 ParlA) on nomination by the all-party Judiciary Committee which consists of
members of both parliamentary chambers and works closely with the parliamentary
groups (Art. 40a ParlA). The Judiciary Committee’s nominations ensure that the
judges’ party memberships approximately correspond to the parliamentary groups’
proportional strengths. Already the Committee’s public announcements of vacant
judgeships indicate the parties to whom successful candidates (de facto) must
belong. Suitable candidates are then invited to hearings before the Committee,
but also before the different parliamentary groups which report their views back
to the Committee before the latter decides on its nominations. This practice of
electing judges according to their political orientation and the parliamentary groups’
proportional strengths is customary and lacks any written legal basis.
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Once elected, a judge’s ordinary term lasts six years, a duration which is considered
sufficiently long to guarantee the constitutional principle of judicial independence
(Art. 191c FC). Exceptionally, if a judge was elected in a supplementary election
to replace a judge who retired or resigned, his or her initial mandate lasts shorter,
viz. only until the next general election (Art. 9 FSCA). Though there is no right to
be re-elected, incumbent judges who apply for a further term are commonly re-
elected. In fact, according to the Judiciary Commission’s own Principes d’action
(Art. 15; French), in case it intends to refuse a judge’s nomination for re-election,
it respects the fair trial principles it follows in impeachment procedures concerning
judges of federal courts of first instance (there is no impeachment procedure for
Federal Supreme Court judges). The Committee thus seems to largely equate non-
re-election to impeachment. In line with this, the re-elections take place prior to and
separate from supplementary elections to seats that have become vacant (Art. 137
ParlA).
Until today, the Federal Assembly has never definitely declined to re-elect an
incumbent judge, but it has happened that an incumbent judge was not re-elected
in the first round. In any case, the current system subjects judges, who often
serve 15 years and longer, to a “political long-term control” (Niccolò Raselli,
Bundesrichterwahlen und richterliche Unabhängigkeit, in: Beatrice Luginbühl/Juana
Schmidt (Hg.), Diskriminierung und Integration, Dike Zürich 2006, 33ff., 39). This
is mostly justified with arguments relating to democratic legitimacy. Seen from the
perspective of the constitutionally guaranteed judicial independence, the current
procedure is not unproblematic, however: more than once, members of the Federal
Assembly have expressed their political disapproval of certain jurisprudence by
“castigating” the involved judges with withholding their votes such that these judges’
re-election results were conspicuously below-average.
The Swiss People’s Party’s attack on Judge
Donzallaz
These days, reports spread about an attempt by the Swiss People’s Party to prevent
the re-election of one of “its” judges. On 23 September 2020, the next general re-
elections to the Federal Supreme Court are due. The Swiss People’s Party asked
the Judiciary Committee not to nominate Judge Donzallaz for re-election or not to
count him any longer as one of “its” judges. Judge Donzallaz was first elected in
2008 and re-elected twice on behalf of the Swiss People’s Party. Now, the Swiss
People’s Party openly justifies itself with politically unwelcome judgments to which
Judge Donzallaz contributed (one concerns the free movement of persons between
Switzerland and the EU, the other concerns the disclosure of bank customer
information to the French tax authorities) and demands the election of a judge more
in line with its party programme.
It has been speculated that smaller parties might support the Swiss People’s Party
out of fear to lose on of “their” judges if a new judge belonging to the Swiss People’s
Party was elected in addition to the re-election of Judge Donzallaz. However, this
would seem rather strange: if a majority re-elects Judge Donzallaz, one would think
that the same majority blocks the election of whomever the Swiss People’s Party
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would like as replacement of Judge Donzallaz. But also on principled grounds, one
would expect (and hope!) that the other parties do not yield to the Swiss People’s
Party’s attempt to politicise the elections to the Federal Supreme Court (even more).
It is not yet definitely known, what strategy the Swiss People’s Party will pursue
on the upcoming elections. However, it has already made abundantly clear that
it considers the blunt politicisation of judicial elections entirely legitimate. Already
this spring, it invited Judge Danzolloz for some sort of reconcilement (Aussprache)
and asked him on this occasion to use his judicial discretion in favour of the party’s
interests, which he reportedly rejected. With regard to the upcoming elections, Judge
Donzallaz has been invited for another hearing. Before this meeting, the Swiss
People’s Party will not officially comment on its position with regard to the upcoming
elections.
Regrettably, the Swiss People’s Party’s comportment may already have impaired
public confidence in the judiciary’s independence. Some of its most senior exponents
have publicly exercised heavy criticism of “its” judge as though he was obliged to
decide in line with the party programme. Some politicians even expressed the utterly
absurd idea of impeachment (neither constitutional nor statutory law provides for an
impeachment of Federal Supreme Court judges). More generally, the party has been
quite forthright about its undertaking of intensified endeavours to strengthen the
representation of its interests at the Federal Supreme Court. To that end, the party’s
parliamentary leader himself chose to join the Judiciary Committee. Thus, even if
Judge Donzallaz will eventually be re-elected as one of the Swiss People’s Party’s
judges, the party’s comportment is apt to increase the (perceived) politicisation of
elections to the Federal Supreme Court.
Impact and reactions
Judicial independence is an important aspect of the rule of law and the separation
of powers. The election procedure described above is doubtlessly questionable.
The most charitable assessment might hold that this procedure has not been to the
obvious detriment of the actual independence of Federal Supreme Court judges
until today: as no judge’s re-election has ever been blocked, there has not been a
strong factual basis for the judges to fear non-re-election. Presumably, the parties,
being aware of the highly problematic potential of the current system, tacitly agreed
to abstain from abusing the judges’ dependence on re-election for exercising
political pressure. Arguably, this has worked reasonably well. Nonetheless, it seems
plausible that the re-election requirement has a chilling effect on the judges which
may deter them from deciding in ways that are likely to stir political discontents.
The events reported above may further darken the picture. It also dims, if two
further considerations are taken into account: First, even if one assumes that
the current system does not affect the judges’ actual independence, it may still
impair the judges’ apparent independence. That is, the appearance created
by the current election procedure, widespread knowledge thereof, and media
reporting on judges’ party memberships run counter to the principle that justice
must not only be done, but seen to be done. The most recent developments
- 3 -
certainly increase the appearance of a politicised court system, regardless of the
eventual election outcome. Second, an assessment must not overlook a further
peculiarity of Switzerland’s court system, the so-called “Obolus” paid by judges.
Judges more or less voluntarily agree to deliver a part of their remuneration to their
party’s funds. These contributions are non-negligible for most parties. A judge may
pay several thousand Swiss Francs (i.e. several thousand Euros) per year. The
parties’ consequent financial dependence on “their” judges – besides diminishing
the chances for a system change – casts a negative light on the judges’ political
impartiality. In short, these payments increase the appearance of judges as quasi-
political office holders.
Switzerland does not conform to pertinent international standards, such as the
European Charter on the Statute for Judges and the Council of Europe’s Committee
of Ministers’ pertinent Recommendation. The Groupe d’États contre la corruption
(GRECO) has expressed criticism and invited Switzerland to implement changes.
Although these opinions and standards are non-binding, they enjoy considerable
persuasive authority on grounds of these bodies’ epistemic authority. The events
discussed suggest that these bodies’ concerns are justified, indeed.
How the problem could be solved
Efforts are being made to change the system radically. A popular initiative asks to
change the current system fundamentally by amending the Federal Constitution: it
suggests selecting judges by lot from candidates whose qualifications are approved
by an expert body. No doubt, this is a radically innovative – an entirely unusual and
unconventional – proposal. Whatever opinion one holds with regard to this proposal,
lesser changes would suffice to solve the most serious of the current problems.
If judges were elected for a fixed, non-renewable term, their dependence on their
sponsoring parties would largely disappear. The judges would still be democratically
legitimate and representative of a broad political spectrum. This would set the judges
at liberty also as regards the “Obolus”. If they were not any longer dependent on
further “electoral assistance” by their parties, they could much more easily refuse
these payments. In sum, quite limited measures would seem to suffice to solve the
worst problems of judicial independence and impartiality or appearance thereof.
Needless to say, the Swiss People’s Party rejects this initiative for reasons of
democratic legitimacy. Paradoxically, its comportment may well boost the initiative.
So, while it remains to be hoped that Judge Donzallaz’s re-election will happen as
smooth as possible in three weeks, if not, one might at least hope that these events
induce change for the better in the long run. Some things are rotten in the state of
Switzerland’s justice system. Betterment would be most welcome!
- 4 -
